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FAMILY LAW-PUTATIVE FATHERS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY-ADAMS AND THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT: CLASHES BETWEEN
THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS IN ARKANSAS.
I. IN THE BEGINNING
We have come a long way since Adams's day. Adams v. State' that is,
in which a jury made a determination of paternity after examining an ille-
gitimate child to see whether she bore any resemblance to her putative fa-
ther.2 Paternity suits have since been stripped of many of their quasi-
criminal characteristics, 3 and, thanks to DNA testing, we certainly have
more reliable means of determining paternity4 than having a jury take a
comparative gander at the illegitimate child and his or her putative father.
Scientific certainty, however, is not the same as moral certainty, and the
increased scientific certainty with which we can now determine biological
paternity has actually decreased the moral certainty husbands can have in
their legal status as father to the children born into the marital family.' In
our day a test may prove conclusively that a child born to a married couple
1. 93 Ark. 260, 124 S.W. 766 (1910).
2. Id. at 263, 124 S.W. at 767. A putative father is "any man not deemed or adjudicated
under the laws of the jurisdiction of the United States to be the father of genetic origin who
claims or is alleged to be the father of genetic origin of the child." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-501(11) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
3. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 109 (1971). Although
the Arkansas Supreme Court held as early as 1885 that paternity actions-then referred to as
proceedings to affiliate a bastard child-were civil and not criminal in nature, the court also
acknowledged that:
Bastardy proceedings have many of the characteristic features of a criminal
prosecution. The State is the Plaintiff. A warrant issues for the apprehension of
the reputed father. When arrested he is required to give bail for his appearance.
The prosecuting attorney conducts the suit on behalf of the State, and officers of
the court are allowed fees as in criminal cases.
Chambers v. State, 45 Ark. 56, 58 (1885).
4. Because detailed discussion of the reliability of blood or DNA tests is beyond the
scope of this note, the reader who seeks such information is referred to the following sources:
Am. Med. Assoc. et al., Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in
Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976), reprinted in SANFORD N. KATZ
& MONROE L. INKER, FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 15 (1979); E. Donald Shapiro et al.,
The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1993).
For an Arkansas case holding blood test results sufficiently conclusive to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy, see Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ark. 244, 251, 478 S.W.2d 423, 428
(1972).
5. See generally Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the
Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 550 (2000) (noting that paternity
determination on the sole basis of genetic testing may suddenly grant a man outside the legal
family structure paternal rights over one or more of the marital children).
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is not the biological child of its presumed father and, by the same token,
may establish a paramour's standing to seek parental rights. 6 The stage is
now set for marital fathers, who have nurtured and cared for their presumed
children, to be declared legal strangers to those same children through no
fault or unfitness of their own.7 Until relatively recently, such a result would
have been nearly impossible in Arkansas. Prior to 1981 putative fathers
simply had no cause of action allowing them to seek a determination of pa-
ternity.8 Furthermore, the legal relationship between married parents and
children born into the marriage was protected by a vigorous common law
presumption that all such children were legitimate.9
Although Arkansas still retains the presumption of legitimacy, it has
undoubtedly lost much of its vigor.' ° In 2001 a divided court announced in
R.N. v. J.M 1 that any man who claims or is alleged to be the genetic father
of a child has standing to file a paternity suit regarding the child, even if the
child already has a presumed father and is part of a marital family.12 Oddly
enough, although a putative father faces no time limits on his right to bring
a paternity suit regarding a child born to married parents, 3 he may be barred
from bringing a paternity suit one year after his child is put up for adoption
without ever having received actual notice of the proceeding. 14 Why is it
1
6. Battle Robinson & Susan Paikin, Who Is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform Parentage
Act (2000), 19 DEL. LAW. 23, 23-24 (2001); cf R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 211, 61 S.W.3d
149, 154 (2001) (holding that a putative father who had an adulterous relationship with a
married woman had standing under section 9-10-104 of the Arkansas Code Annotated to
petition for a determination of paternity of a child born into the marital family and presumed
to be legitimate).
7. Glennon, supra note 5, at 551; cf Jill Handley Andersen, The Functioning Father: A
Unified Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847, 847 (1991-1992)
(discussing the threat of displacement faced by functional fathers).
8. Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 398-99, 614 S.W.2d 667, 670 (1981); Janet A.
Flaccus, A Grab Bag of Recent Arkansas Cases, 1999 ARK. L. NOTEs 25, 36 n. 18.
9. Thomas v. Pacheco, 293 Ark. 564, 567-68, 740 S.W.2d 123, 125 (1987) (noting
that the presumption of legitimacy was very difficult to rebut and one of the strongest known
to the law).
10. There is no doubt that "the presumption of legitimacy has been withering and
shrinking in the face of scientific advances." Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ark. 244, 248,
478 S.W.2d 423, 426 (1972) (quoting Anonymous v. Anonymous, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1956)).
11. 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001).
12. Id. at210-11,61 S.W.3dat 152-54.
13. Section 9-10-102(b) of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides:
Actions brought in the State of Arkansas to establish paternity may be brought at
any time. Any action brought prior to August 1, 1985, but dismissed because of
a statute of limitations in effect prior to that date, may be brought for any person
for whom paternity has not yet been established.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-102(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
14. Section 9-9-216(b) of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides, in pertinent part:
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that putative fathers are barred from bringing a paternity suit regarding an
adopted child after only one year, but remain free to bring a paternity suit
anytime regarding a child born to and raised by married parents? Do the
parental rights of adoptive parents merit more constitutional or legislative
protection than those of marital parents? This note suggests some possible
answers.
Part II begins with a broad historical overview of the presumption of
legitimacy and the common law treatment of those parents and children who
fell beyond its pale. Next it outlines United States Supreme Court decisions
that redefined this area of the law and which gave rise to the rights of puta-
tive fathers. Afterwards, this note details some of the Arkansas Supreme
Court cases that followed in the wake of these decisions. With special atten-
tion to R.N., it examines the court's current doctrine regarding the clash
between the rights of putative fathers and the presumption of legitimacy. It
closes by outlining some of the concerns voiced by the concurring and dis-
senting Justices. Part III discusses implications of R.N. for children, fami-
lies, and the institution of marriage. It also articulates reasons why the legis-
lature might want to reconsider current policy and proposes some changes
that may better secure the best interest of children and the integrity of fami-
lies. Part IV offers summary answers to the questions posed in the introduc-
tion and concludes the note.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Presumption of Legitimacy: From Early Civil
and Common Law to the Modern Age
The presumption of legitimacy dates back to Roman civil law.' 5 Ro-
man law summed up the presumption with the following maxim: Pater est
quem nuptiae demonstrant (marriage establishes who the father is). 16 The
[Ulpon the expiration of one (1) year after an adoption decree is issued, the de-
cree cannot be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner
upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required
notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter unless, in the
case of the adoption of a minor, the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor
or, in the case of the adoption of an adult, the adult had no knowledge of the de-
cree within the one-year period.
Id. § 9-9-216(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002); Kathryn A. Sampson et al., Arkansas's Putative Father
Registry and Related Adoption Code Provisions: Inadequate Protection for Thwarted Puta-
tive Fathers, 1997 ARK. L. NoTEs 49, 50.
15. Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 116, 173 S.W. 842, 843 (1915).
16. JoHN BRYDALL, LEX SPURIORUM: OR THE LAW RELATING TO BASTARDY 83 (Gar-
land Publ'g 1978) (1703). Brydall translates the maxim thus: "That he is the Father, whom
Wedlock declareth." Id. Alternatively, in Dennis v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
2003]
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common law adopted this rule and generally admitted no proof challenging
the legitimacy of a child born into a marital family unless circumstances
clearly left no reasonable room for doubt.17 Accordingly, evidence of a
child's illegitimacy was admissible where (1) a woman's husband was be-
yond the four seas (i.e., beyond the jurisdiction of the King of England) or
"so far absent from his Wife, or imprisoned" so as to bar any possibility of
physical intimacy between the married couple at the time of conception; (2)
the husband was so grievously sick or disabled that he "could not lie with
his Wife" at the time of conception; (3) the husband had "an apparent Im-
possibility of Procreation, as if the Husband be but eight years old, or under
the Age of Procreation;" or (4) the wife left her husband and did "altogether
cohabit" with an adulterer.' 8 In this last circumstance, however, evidence of
illegitimacy was inadmissible if the husband still had "Access unto the
Mother" at the time of conception. 19 Even in the face of blatant infidelity,
the presumption of legitimacy required the husband to support marital chil-
dren as his own unless his paternity was a patent impossibility.20 If a man
married a woman "great with Child by another," his marriage to her had the
effect of making him the child's legal father as long as the child was born
after the wedding.2'
One policy justification for the presumption of legitimacy is that it
prevented marital children from being "bastardized" on grounds as tenuous
as the child's dissimilarity to the paterfamilias.2 Caution called for erring
on the side of presuming a child's legitimacy due to the severity of the dis-
abilities imposed upon a child deemed illegitimate. 23 The common law re-
garded an illegitimate child as filius populi and quasi nullius filius24 (son of
the people, and as if the son of no one).25 As the legal child of no one, the
illegitimate child was no one's legal heir.2 6 As a child of the people, the
Services, the court provides the following translation: "The nuptials show who is the father."
566 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
17. See BRYDALL, supra note 16, at 83-84; WILFRID HOOPER, THE LAW OF
ILLEGITIMACY 153-54 (1911).
18. BRYDALL, supra note 16, at 87-89.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 86 ("Albeit the Wife were as common as the Cart-way, making open Profes-
sion of her Filthiness; yet the Husband, if he be not altogether out of his Guard, shall be
adjudged the only Father.").
21. Id. at 83-84. In this respect marriage seemed to operate as an adoption.
22. Paterfamilias means head of the household or head of the family. JOHN C.
TRAUPMAN, THE NEW COLLEGE LATIN & ENGLISH DICTIONARY 213 (1966).
23. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
24. BRYDALL, supra note 16, at 18.
25. TRAUPMAN, supra note 22, at 116,,,197, 233,256.
26. BRYDALL, supra note 16, at 15-19. An illegitimate child could not claim either
"Honour or Arms from the Father or Mother," effectively barring any claim to nobility that
would otherwise have passed to the child through his or her biological ancestry. Id. at 15.
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illegitimate child was a ward of the public, and legal custody of the child
rested with the public authorities.27
B. Beyond the Presumption: Children Born Outside of Wedlock
With no legally recognized parents, extramarital children generally had
no legal right to support from their natural or putative parents.28 The impact
of this was softened somewhat by the common law presumption that parents
who cohabitated and who represented themselves as husband and wife were
legally married.29 Consequently, children born to such couples were pre-
sumed to be legitimate. 30 And even though an extramarital child had no
legal claim on his natural parents as filius nullius, as fifius populi he could
lay claim to support from the community he was born into.31 Eventually the
Poor Law Acts, enacted in the sixteenth and nineteenth century, shifted the
duty of maintenance from the community to the natural parents of the ex-
Nor could an illegitimate child enter the ranks of the priesthood. Id. at 20. This did not pre-
vent illegitimate children from rising to prominence on their own accord, as demonstrated by
William the Conqueror, who honestly and unabashedly styled himself "William the Bastard."
HOOPER, supra note 17, at 5.
27. HOOPER, supra note 17, at 125. The introduction of Lord Mansfield's rule in Good-
right v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777), made the presumption of legitimacy even
more difficult to rebut. HOOPER, supra note 17, at 202. Lord Mansfield's rule was a common
law rule of evidence that prevented both the husband and wife from testifying as to whether
or not they had access to each other at the time one of their presumably legitimate children
was conceived. Id. Lord Mansfield declared that the rule was one founded on "decency,
morality, and policy," and expressed his opinion that parents, especially mothers, should not
be allowed to claim after a marriage that their marital children were in reality illegitimate. Id.
Arkansas adopted Lord Mansfield's rule in 1915. See Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark.
113, 173 S.W. 842 (1915); see also Thomas v. Pacheco, 293 Ark. 564, 567, 740 S.W.2d 123,
124 (1987). In a delightful passage from Kennedy, the court justified the ban on spousal
testimony as a means of preventing spouses from "proclaim[ing] their own lechery and their
infidelity to each other and reveal[ing] secrets that are so purely delicate and personal as to
make it grossly indecent to advertise them to the world." 117 Ark. at 116, 173 S.W. at 843. It
explained that allowing spouses to do so would "not only scandalize the sacred marital rela-
tion, but [also] cast a cloud upon the life of the unoffending child, and subject it to handicaps
and embarrassments that are always most hurtful and most difficult to overcome." Id., 173
S.W. at 843.
As of 1989 Lord Mansfield's rule is no longer the rule in Arkansas. Leach v. Leach,
57 Ark. App. 155, 158, 942 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1997). The doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel, however, are currently employed to keep divorcing and divorced parents from
"bastardizing" the children of the marriage, effectively advancing some of the same policy
goals advanced by Lord Mansfield's rule. See Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Wil-
liams, 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999).
28. HOOPER, supra note 17, at 101.
29. Id. at 147.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 125.
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tramarital child.32 Under the Poor Law Acts, mothers--the most readily
identifiable natural parents-were held primarily responsible for the main-
tenance of their extramarital children, but they could also obtain a court
order requiring a child's natural father to provide maintenance support.
33
Legislatures on this side of the Atlantic enacted statutes to the same ef-
fect in what were commonly referred to as Bastardy Acts.34 In 1838 Arkan-
sas passed its own Bastardy Act, 35 under which the putative father of an
illegitimate child could be prosecuted and ordered to pay for the "lying-in
expenses of the mother not less than five nor more than fifteen dollars, and
for the support of the child a monthly sum of not less than one nor more
than three dollars. 36 These provisions were intended "for the benefit of the
fallen mother and unfortunate child, as well as for the protection of the pub-
lic," and for "punishment of the guilty father." 37 Such proceedings, although
resulting in a determination of paternity, sought to secure support for ille-
gitimate children, not to secure state assistance for putative fathers who
needed help tracking down and identifying their natural children so that they
could claim parental prerogatives.
38
Despite granting illegitimate children the right to financial support
from their putative fathers, state laws still generally denied them many of
the privileges normally accorded to other children. 39 Some states denied
them the right to inherit from their father or the right to their decedent par-
ent's wrongful death and workers' compensation benefits. 40 Among these
states was Arkansas, which allowed extramarital children to inherit from
their mother, but denied them the right to inherit from their fathers.4'
The United States Supreme Court provided impetus for reform by de-
claring several such statutes unconstitutional. 42 In 1952 some of the mem-
32. Id. at 102-03.
33. Id.
34. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643, 649
(2001).
35. Jackson v. State, 29 Ark. 62, 64 (1874).
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id.
38. Rodes, supra note 34, at 649.
39. Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children " and Their Parents Before the United States
Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1999).
40. Flaccus, supra note 8, at 26. As noted in the article, this changed largely due to a
series of United States Supreme Court cases that struck down unconstitutional state statutes
unreasonably burdening illegitimate children. Id.
41. Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 396, 614 S.W.2d 667, 669 (1981) (citing Frakes
v. Hunt, 266 Ark. 171, 583 S.W.2d 497 (1981); Lucas v. Handcock, 266 Ark. 142, 583
S.W.2d 491 (1979)).
42. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that denial of child support to ille-
gitimate children was illogical, unjust, and unconstitutional); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
[Vol. 25
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bers of the Court indicated their belief that the doctrine offilius nullius was
not generally applicable outside of inheritance law,4 3 and by 1972 the Court
implicitly rejected the doctrine by recognizing that a legally cognizable par-
ent-child relationship existed between extramarital children and their natural
parents. 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court took its cue from these cases and
declared its state law disallowing paternal inheritance for illegitimate chil-
dren unconstitutional.45
C. The Rise of Paternal Rights for the Putative Father
1. 1972: Opening the Door for the Rights of Natural Fathers
Legal recognition of the filial relationship between illegitimate chil-
dren and their natural fathers not only helped advance the rights of extra-
marital children, but also had the corollary effect of endowing putative fa-
thers with parental privileges they had never enjoyed under the common
law.46 In Stanley v. Illinois,47 the Court opened the door to the recognition of
parental rights in putative fathers. Stanley arose when the unmarried mother
of three children died, and her children became wards of the state.48 Peter
Stanley, the natural father of the three children, sought to retain custody of
them, but as he was an unwed father, the State of Illinois did not recognize
the familial relationship. 49 Despite the fact that he had lived with the chil-
dren for eighteen years, the State of Illinois effectively presumed him to be
unfit, removed the children from his custody, and placed them with court-
appointed guardians. 50 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause prohibited Illinois from dismantling a natural fam-
ily without first providing the natural father a hearing and proving him un-
fit.
51
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (holding that denial of workers' compensation benefits to depend-
ent illegitimate children was unconstitutional); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (hold-
ing a Louisiana statute denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful
death of their mother unconstitutional).
43. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 584 (1956) (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
45. Roque, 272 Ark. at 396, 614 S.W.2d at 669.
46. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645; Roque, 272 Ark. at 392, 614 S.W.2d at 667.
47. 405 U.S. at 645.
48. Id. at 646.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 646, 658.
51. Id. at 658.
2003]
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2. 1978: The Rights of Natural Fathers Versus the Rights of a For-
mal Family Unit
Although Stanley established that the private interest of an unwed fa-
ther in children he had "sired and raised" warranted deference and protec-
tion,52 Quilloin v. Walcott53 clarified that the interest of unwed fathers who
had never exercised care or custody of their children did not warrant the
same protection. 4 Leon Quilloin, an unwed father, sought to block the
adoption of his natural child by its stepfather.55 When the putative father
argued that he was entitled to "an absolute veto over adoption of his [natu-
ral] child, absent a finding of his unfitness as a parent," the Court informed
him otherwise.
5 6
Before making its determination, the Court noted that Leon had rarely
visited the child and had offered scant support. On the other hand, it noted
that the marital family was already intact and that allowing the stepfather to
adopt the child would merely give full recognition to a family unit already
in existence.5 8 The Court also noted that the child himself expressed a desire
to be adopted by his stepfather and that the stepfather had been found to be
a fit and proper person to adopt the child.59 Rejecting Leon's contention that
he was entitled to the same procedural safeguards that would have applied
to a marital father, the Court pointed out that, unlike a married father, he
had never exercised actual or legal custody, nor shouldered "any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or
care of the child., 60 The Court further noted that legal custody of children
was "a central aspect of the marital relationship" and that even a divorced
father "will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children"
during the marriage.61 On the basis of these distinctions, the Court held that
it was within the state's power to afford differing levels of procedural pro-
tection to marital and putative fathers based on the extent of their commit-
ment to the welfare of their children.
62
52. Id. at 651.
53. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
54. Id. at 255.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id. at 253.
57. Id. at 251.
58. Id.
59. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.





3. 1979: The Rights of Natural Fathers with Developed Relation-
ships
A different result was obtained in Caban v. Mohammed,63 where the
unwed father had previously dwelt with his two children and their mother
and had developed a substantial relationship with the children.64 Abdiel
Caban, Maria Mohammed, and their children had lived together as a family
from 1968 to 1973.65 "Caban and Mohammed represented themselves as
being husband and wife," 66 and both contributed to the "care and support of
the children." 67 The Court determined that Caban's parental rights war-
ranted constitutional protection because he had come "forward to partici-
pate" in the rearing of his children; therefore Caban was able to block the
adoption of his children by his ex-mate's husband. 68 The Court held that
New York's statutory scheme, which required adoptive parents to obtain the
consent of a child's natural mother but did not require the consent of the
natural father, denied equal protection to men and women, and was there-
fore unconstitutional.69
4. 1983: Solidifying the Developed Relationship Test
Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban suggest that the strongest constitutional
protection is not reserved for the genealogical relationship that arises from
certain proof of biological paternity, but for the parent-child relationship
that arises from the assumption of parental duty and the interaction of parent
and child. This principle finds open expression in Lehr v. Robertson,
70
where Jonathan Lehr sought to vacate the adoption of his putative daughter
Jessica.7' Jonathan was not named as Jessica's father on the birth certificate,
and he had never contributed any financial support to her.72 When Jessica
was only eight months old, Jessica's mother Lorraine married Richard
63. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
64. Id. at 389.
65. Id. at 382.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 389.
68. Id. at 392. Although Stanley and Caban were decided on constitutional grounds, it is
interesting to note that the same result could have been obtained under the combined effect
of common law marriage and the presumption of legitimacy. The cohabitating couples would
have been presumed married, and the offspring of the presumptively married cohabitants
would have been presumed the legitimate children of the marriage. See HOOPER, supra note
17, at 147.
69. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.





Robertson. 73 When Jessica was two years old, the marital couple filed for
adoption.74 Because Jonathan was not Jessica's father of record and had not
added his name to the putative father registry, Jonathan was never given any
formal notice of the adoption proceeding. 75 He only learned of it when he
filed a "visitation and paternity" petition and was informed that he could not
proceed with his paternity suit because the adoption had already been
granted.76 Jonathan unsuccessfully sought to vacate the adoption at both
trial court and appellate court.77 Jonathan appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court and argued that the New York statutory scheme was unconsti-
tutional because a "putative father's actual or potential relationship with a
child born out of wedlock is an interest in liberty which may not be de-
stroyed without due process of law" and that as a putative father "he had a
constitutional right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before he
was deprived of that interest." 78 Jonathan drew support for his contention
from Stanley and Caban.
79
The Court defined the issue as "whether New York has sufficiently
protected an unmarried father's inchoate relationship with a child whom he
has never supported and rarely seen in the two years since her birth. ' 80 The
Court distinguished between the substantive due process rights of married
parents to maintain their parental relationships with their children 81 and
those of unwed fathers whose only relationship was biological.82 The major-
ity emphasized the valuable role that the "institution of marriage" played in
both "defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing
the decentralized structure of our democratic society" and noted that state
laws almost universally expressed an "appropriate preference" for the for-
mal family.83 The Court even went as far as to state that, in some cases, "the
Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protec-
tion for certain formal family relationships" and that "the rights of parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.,
84
According to the Court, the holding of Stanley was that the Due Proc-
ess Clause "was violated by the automatic destruction of the custodial rela-
73. Id. at 250.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 252.
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252-53.
77. Id. at 254-55.
78. Id. at 255.
79. Id. at 250 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972)).
80. Id. at 249-50.
81. Id. at 257-58.
82. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
83. Id. at 256-57.
84. Id. at 257.
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tionship without giving the father any opportunity to present evidence re-
garding his fitness as a parent." 85 The Court also noted that Caban involved
the conflicting claims of two natural parents who both had developed custo-
dial relationships with their natural children. 86 Contrasting the developed
parent-child relationships that existed in Stanley and Caban with the bio-
logical relationships that existed in Quilloin and in the case before it, the
Court concluded that:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsi-
bilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing
of his child," his interest in personal contact with his child acquires sub-
stantial protection under the due process clause .... But the mere exis-
tence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protec-
tion. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association .. ,87
Accordingly, the Court found that New York's putative father registry
adequately protected the interests of Jonathan (and of putative fathers like'
him), who had "never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with" his biological daughter.88 The Court further noted that
"[t]he most effective protection of the putative father's opportunity to de-
velop a relationship with his child is provided by the laws that authorize
formal marriage and govern its consequences. 89
5. 1989: The Rights of Putative Fathers Versus the Rights of Marital
Fathers
No other Supreme Court case deals as directly with the clash between
the rights of putative fathers and the rights of marital parents as does Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D. 90 In Michael H., the Court was faced with a putative
father who had engaged in an adulterous relationship and who later sought
to establish his paternity and visitation privileges regarding the child he
believed had sprung from his liaison.91 Gerald D. and Carole D. married in
1976 and were living together in Playa del Rey, California.92 During the
summer of 1978, Carole began having an affair with her neighbor, Michael
85. Id. at 259.
86. Id. at 259-60.
87. Id. at 261 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Fos-
ter Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
88. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
89. Id. at 263.
90. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
91. Id. at 114.
92. Id. at 113.
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H. 93 Carole conceived a child, Victoria, to whom she gave birth in 1981. 94
Gerald was listed as Victoria's father on the birth certificate, and he held her
out to the world as his daughter.95 Shortly after Victoria's birth, however,
Carole informed Michael that he might be Victoria's biological father.
96
Blood tests, conducted later at Carole's behest, indicated a 98.07% probabil-
ity that he was.97
In November of 1982, Carole refused to allow Michael to visit Victo-
ria, and Michael filed an action to establish his paternity and to secure visi-
tation rights. 98 The court appointed a guardian ad litem for Victoria, who
filed a cross-complaint on Victoria's behalf asserting that Victoria was enti-
tled to maintain filial relationships with both of her fathers.99 Carole filed a
motion for summary judgment in 1983, but later withdrew her motion when
she began living with Michael. 100 In 1984, after reconciling with Carole,
Gerald intervened and successfully moved for summary judgment.' Gerald
claimed that there were no issues of fact for trial because Victoria was pre-
sumed legitimate as a child of the marriage, and the presumption could only
be rebutted by either the husband or the wife. 0 2 The California Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment and upheld the constitutionality of the perti-
nent statutes. 0 3 After the appellate court denied a rehearing, the California
Supreme Court denied discretionary review, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 104
Michael asserted it would be an unconstitutional violation of due proc-
ess for the state to terminate his liberty interest in his relationship with his
daughter without providing him an opportunity to establish his paternity in
an evidentiary hearing. 05 He also contended as a matter of substantive due
process that, given his established parental relationship with Victoria, the




96. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 114.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 114-15.
100. Id. at 114.
101. Id. at 115.
102. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115-16 (citing to CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 621(a) (West
Supp. 1989), which only allowed the husband or wife to rebut the presumption if the husband
was impotent, sterile, or they were no longer cohabitating with each other).
103. Id. at 116.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 119.
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cient to support termination of his relationship with his biological daugh-
ter.1
0 6
The plurality of the Court began its analysis by clarifying that Michael
was "seeking to be declared the father of Victoria," ostensibly to obtain
visitation rights. 0 7 Naturally, in seeking to be declared Victoria's father,
Michael was also seeking all other parental rights inherent in parental
status. 10 8 Noting that California had no provision for dual fatherhood, the
plurality also emphasized that Michael's legal status as Victoria's father
could only come at the expense of Gerald's. 10 9 It rejected Michael's proce-
dural due process argument as being based on a fundamental misconception
of the true nature of California's codified presumption of legitimacy." 0
Quoting the California Court of Appeals, the plurality explained that the
presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a determi-
nation by the Legislature as a matter of overriding social policy, that
given a certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband
is to be held responsible for the child, and that the integrity of the family
unit should not be impugned. I '
The plurality indicated that Michael was effectively objecting to the
substantive policies of the state and noted that the real issue was not
whether the presumption denied him adequate procedures, but whether there
was an adequate fit between the classifications set up by the law and the
policy that the classifications were supposed to advance." 2 The plurality
opined that the presumption both stated and furthered the substantive policy
of the state by "excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be
destructive of family integrity and privacy."" 
3
Turning its attention to Michael's contention that the state interest in
protecting Carole and Gerald's marriage was not sufficient to justify its ter-
mination of his relationship with Victoria, the plurality concluded that Mi-
chael never had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relation-
ship with Victoria to begin with. 14 Instead it found that the protected inter-
ests lay with the marital family.' '5 The plurality observed that the presump-
106. Id. at 121.
107. Id. at 118.
108. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 118.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 119.
111. Id. at 119-20.
112. ld. at 121.
113. Id. at 120.




tion of legitimacy was "a fundamental principle of the common law"'1 16 and
held that where a "child is born into an extant marital family, the natural
father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity
of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to
give categorical preference to the latter."'
' 17
D. The Rise of Parental Rights for Putative Fathers and Permutations of
the Presumption of Legitimacy in Arkansas
1. Arkansas Adopts Stanley and Quilloin
In 1981 both the General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court
independently concluded that a putative father had the right to petition for a
determination of paternity. 118 The General Assembly passed Act 664 of
1981,119 which granted any man the right to file a petition for a determina-
tion of paternity, and Act 665 of 1981,2 ° which provided that any man de-
clared to be the father of an illegitimate child could petition for custody.' 21
Possessed by the same zeitgeist as the General Assembly, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held in Roque v. Frederick that natural fathers had "basic
rights" concerning the welfare of their children 22 and declared Arkansas's
paternity statute unconstitutional because it granted the mother of an ille-
gitimate child the right to petition for a determination of paternity without
granting putative fathers the same right. 1
23
Roque arose when a California couple who had been living together
and who had a child out of wedlock, separated. 124 After the separation, An-
drew, the natural father, paid child support and visited regularly. 125 Deb-
orah, the child's mother, moved to Arkansas with her child when the baby
was nearly twenty months old.126 Andrew sought a determination of pater-
nity and visitation privileges. 127 Deborah moved to dismiss Andrew's peti-
tion on the grounds that putative fathers had no standing to file such a peti-
116. Id.
117. Id. at 129.
118. Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 393 n.1, 614 S.W.2d 667, 667 n.1 (1981).
119. Act of Mar. 23, 1981, No. 664, 1981 Ark. Acts 1517 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2002)).
120. Act of Mar. 23, 1981, No. 665, 1981 Ark. Acts 1518 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-113 (LEXIS Repl. 2002)).
121. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 667 n.1.
122. Id. at 398, 614 S.W.2d at 670.
123. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 670.
124. Id. at 394, 614 S.W.2d at 668.
125. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 668.
126. Roque, 272 Ark. at 394, 614 S.W.2d at 668.
127. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 668.
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tion under Arkansas law.' 28 Andrew argued that the Arkansas paternity stat-
ute violated equal protection because it granted natural mothers standing to
petition for a determination of paternity but did not grant putative fathers
the right to file a suit to establish their own paternity. 29 He also argued that
Arkansas law would violate his right to due process if it did not grant him a
hearing on the question of paternity and visitation.'
30
The Arkansas Supreme Court, expressly relying on Stanley and Quil-
loin, 3 ' held that fathers of illegitimate children have basic--albeit unde-
fined---rights where the welfare of their children is concerned 132 and granted
Andrew the right to petition for a determination of paternity without ever
identifying whether it was doing so on either equal protection or due proc-
ess grounds. 133 Justice Hickman, in the opinion of the court, remarked that
the laws concerning illegitimate children and the rights of the natural par-
ents had been harsh for centuries, and he provided a snippet from Deuteron-
omy 23:2 as an example.' 34 In a paean to the new morality, he wrote:
The law has changed because it must. Whatever wrongs the parents did
are no fault of the child, and whatever wrong the parents did should not
forever deny them the privileges that other parents enjoy. People should
be allowed to acknowledge their mistakes and try to rectify them. So the
law has changed from discrimination against illegitimate children and
unwed parents to a more tolerant view.
135
2. 1988: Arkansas Adopts Lehr in the Context of Adoptions
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court held that fathers of illegitimate
children had basic rights regarding their children, 36 the court later clarified
in In re Adoption of S.J.B. 13 7 that these rights only arose where said father
had established relationships with their children.1
38
128. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 668.
129. Id. at 394-95, 614 S.W.2d at 668.
130. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 668.
131. Id. at 397-98, 614 S.W.2d at 669-70 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
132. Roque, 272 Ark. at 398, 614 S.W.2d at 670.
133. Id., 614 S.W.2d at 670.
134. Id. at 395, 614 S.W.2d at 669 ("No bastard shall enter the Assembly of the Lord.").
135. Id. at 396, 614 S.W.2d at 669.
136. Id. at 398, 614 S.W.2d at 670.
137. 294 Ark. 598, 745 S.W.2d 606 (1988), superceded by statute as stated in R.N. v.
J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001).
138. Id. at 601, 745 S.W.2d at 608.
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Baby Roe, the subject child of S.J.B., was born on July 9, 1987, to June
Roe, who was fifteen years old and unmarried. 139 According to June, the
pregnancy resulted from an isolated sexual encounter. 140 June refused to
disclose the identity of the biological father and made no effort to notify
him of the child's birth.' 4 1 Shortly after Baby Roe was born, June and her
court appointed guardian ad litem executed a "Consent to Adoption and
Waiver and Entry of Appearance" in favor of Adoption Services, Inc. 142 The
adoption agency placed the child with D.J.B. and K.B.B., who filed a peti-
tion for adoption in the Pulaski County Probate Court' 43 At the adoption
hearing, the trial court found that the adoption was proper in all respects
save for the fact that the father had not been given notice.' 44 Although the
court noted that the applicable Arkansas statutes did not require notice to
the father in such a case, 145 on its own initiative the court held that failing to
give notice to the father violated both due process and equal protection.
46
The court stayed the adoption proceeding "until such time as evidence of
notice to the father of its pendency is submitted to the [c]ourt," effectively
terminating the proceeding.1
47
The Arkansas Supreme Court formulated the issue on appeal as being
"whether under the circumstances of this case notice to the father is man-
dated by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution."' 148 The majority held that the Equal Protection and Due Proc-
ess Clauses of the Federal Constitution did not require notice to be given to
the putative father. 149 Because the language of the Arkansas statutes did not
require notice of an adoption proceeding to be given to a putative father
unless he had "otherwise legitimated" the child, 50 the court also concluded
139. Id. at 599, 745 S.W.2d at 607.
140. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
141. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
142. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
143. S.J.B., 294 Ark. at 599, 745 S.W.2d at 607.
144. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
145. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-206 to -207 (LEXIS Repl. 2002). Section 9-9-206 enumer-
ates those persons who are required to consent to an adoption; subsection (a)(2) requires the
written consent of the father of the minor "if the father was married to the mother at the time
the minor was conceived or at any time thereafter, the minor is his child by adoption, he has
custody of the minor at the time the petition is filed, or he has otherwise legitimated the
minor according to the laws of the place in which the adoption proceeding is brought." Id.
§ 9-9-206. Section 9-9-207 lists persons to whom notice and consent are not required; sub-
section (a)(3) reads: "The father of a minor if the father's consent is not required by
9-9-206(a)(2)." Id. § 9-9-207.
146. S.J.B., 294 Ark. at 600, 745 S.W.2d at 607.
147. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
148. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 607.
149. Id. at 602-03, 745 S.W.2d at 608.
150. Id. at 600, 745 S.W.2d at 607.
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that Daddy Doe did not meet any of the statutory criteria that would have
entitled him to notice.1 51 The court distinguished the case before it from
Stanley and Caban by pointing out that it was not dealing with a putative
father who had developed a substantial relationship, but "with the situation
where the father is merely 'the biological link' which brought the child into
existence."' 15 2 The court cited Stanley as standing for the proposition "that
the Due Process Clause was violated by the automatic destruction of the
parental rights of a father who had had a custodial relationship with his
children without giving the father any opportunity to present evidence re-
garding his fitness as a parent."' 153 It also drew support from Quilloin by
noting that the Court upheld the constitutionality of a "statute that author-
ized the adoption of a child over the objection of the natural father who had
never legitimated the child."' 54 From Caban, the court drew the rule that
adoption statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause when they distin-
guished "between a mother and father who are in fact similarly situated with
regard to their relationship with the child."'' 55 Citing to Lehr, the court noted
that "an unmarried father lacking a custodial, personal, or financial relation-
ship with [a] child was not constitutionally entitled to notice of the child's
adoption proceeding."'' 56 After reviewing the aforementioned cases, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court held:
The parent-child relationship is a basic fabric of our society. There can
be no doubt that this relationship merits constitutional protection unless
the circumstances are exceptional .... Society has always expressed a
preference for formal families, and married parents generally have been
considered to have equal authority over, and rights to, their children. It is
clear from the foregoing discussion and the circumstances of this case
that this father's inchoate relationship with his child is not entitled to
''equivalent constitutional protection" under the Due Process Clause.
[.I. I]t is clear from Lehr that a parent lacking a custodial, personal,
or financial relationship with his child is not constitutionally entitled to
notice. We agree with the appellants' statement that the question is not
151. Id. at 603,745 S.W.2d at 609.
152. SJB., 294 Ark. at 600-01, 745 S.W.2d at 608.
153. Id. at 601, 745 S.W.2d at 608 (citing to Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
154. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 608.
155. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 608.
156. Id., 745 S.W.2d at 608 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)).
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so much whether the state may terminate the father's parental rights
without notice, but whether parental rights attached in the first place.'
57
Later in the same year, in Willmon v. Hunter,158 without any mention
of a preference for formal families, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it
was not against the public policy of Arkansas to allow a putative father to
establish his paternity of a child conceived during the mother's marriage to
another man and that the presumption of legitimacy did not preclude litigat-
ing the issue of paternity in such circumstances. 59 Willmon announced a
marked turn in favor of the rights of putative fathers and a turn away from a
strong presumption of legitimacy. Only the year before in Thomas v.
Pacheco, 16 the court had stated that:
Marriage is still considered an honorable institution; children born dur-
ing marriage should be deemed legitimate, and legal efforts to declare
such children illegitimate are not and should not be made easy.
Belief in that principle is so great that we have created a legal pre-
sumption to protect it. This presumption, that a child born during mar-
riage is the legitimate child of the parties to that marriage, is one of the
strongest presumptions recognized by the law. It can be overcome, but
not easily. We have consistently held that the presumption is rebuttable
only by the strongest type of conclusive evidence, such as the husband's
impotence, or the non-access of the parties. 161
Both Willmon and Thomas were decided a few years prior to Michael
H. and under a different paternity statute than that which is currently in ef-
fect.162 The current paternity statute, 163 enacted under the heading "[s]uit to
determine paternity of illegitimate child,' ' 164 allows a putative father to peti-
157. Id. at 602-03, 745 S.W.2d at 609. Justice Glaze, although concurring in the result,
expressed his concern that the Arkansas statutory scheme was constitutionally deficient
because it did not protect a putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child. Id. at 604, 745 S.W.2d at 609 (Glaze, J., concurring). Specifically, he noted that Ar-
kansas did not have a putative father registry as New York did in Lehr. Id. at 606, 745
S.W.2d at 611. (Glaze, J., concurring). In 1989 the Arkansas General Assembly addressed
this concern by enacting the Putative Father Registry. Sampson, supra note 14, at 49. An
unregistered putative father has no right to notice of a pending adoption. In re Adoption of
Reeves, 309 Ark. 385, 831 S.W.2d 607 (1992).
158. 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924 (1988).
159. Id. at 359, 761 S.W.2d at 925.
160. 293 Ark. 564, 740 S.W.2d 123 (1987).
161. Id. at 567-68, 740 S.W.2d at 125 (internal citation omitted).
162. R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 215, 61 S.W.3d 149, 156 (2001).




tion for a determination of paternity "at any time.' ' 165 Although at first blush
the plain language of the heading appears to limit the statute's application to
illegitimate children, in R.N. v. J.M,16 6 the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
strued the statutory language as granting putative fathers standing to seek a
determination of paternity regardless of whether the child in question is
illegitimate.167 R.N. merits special attention because of the issues it raises,
the issues it avoids, and the ideological divisions it reveals among the jus-
tices regarding putative fathers and the definition of family.
3. R.N. v. J.M.: Dueling Initials
a. Substantive facts of R.N. v. J.M
J.M. and B.M. married in 1992.168 Four years into the marriage J.M.
became involved in an adulterous relationship with R.N.-a relationship
that supposedly ended sometime in the early part of 1997.169 During her
involvement with R.N., J.M. also continued to have sexual relations with
her husband. 170 On August 17, 1997, J.M. gave birth to a baby girl, A.M.,
who was presumably the legitimate child of B.M.171 After being released
from the hospital, A.M. went to the home of her marital parents. 172 Al-
though R.N. and J.M. discussed the possibility that he was the biological
father of A.M., R.N. never established a relationship with the child. 173 He
did see the child on two occasions: once at the home of B.M. and J.M. and
once again at his office. 174 According to his later testimony, he would have
established a relationship with the child if J.M. had allowed him to see
her.
175
b. Procedural facts and legal issues
On April 7, 1998, R.N. filed a petition for a determination of paternity,
and on April 20, 1998, he filed a motion for paternity testing pursuant to
section 9-10-108 of the Arkansas Code Annotated. 176 In her reply J.M. de-
165. Id. § 9-10-102(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
166. 347 Ark. at 203, 61 S.W.3d at 149.
167. Id. at211,61 S.W.3dat 154.
168. Id. at 207, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
169. Id.,61 S.W.3dat 151.
170. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151.
171. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151.
172. R.N., 347 Ark. at 207, 61 S.W. 3d at 151.
173. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151.
174. Id.,61 S.W.3dat 151.
175. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151.
176. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151 (citing to ARK. CODEANN. § 9-10-108).
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nied that R.N. was A.M.'s father and moved to dismiss the action on three
grounds: (1) R.N. lacked standing because A.M. was presumed legitimate,
and the Arkansas paternity statutes were only applicable to illegitimate chil-
dren; (2) R.N. had no constitutionally protected interest as he had never
established a relationship with A.M.; and (3) R.N. was equitably estopped
from bringing the paternity action because he did not file his petition until
nine months after A.M.'s birth.' B.M. intervened on June 29, 1999, and
joined his wife in her motion to dismiss R.N.'s paternity suit. 178 On August
31, 1999, the trial court granted J.M. and B.M.'s motion to dismiss. 79 The
trial court adopted J.M.'s legal arguments as its conclusions of law. 180 Ac-
cordingly, the court determined that R.N. lacked standing to bring the pater-
nity action as a matter of law and that he was equitably estopped from
bringing the action. 18 1 R.N. appealed, and the case came before the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court. 
82
On appeal R.N. argued that, as a putative father, he had standing under
section 9-10-104 of the Arkansas Code Annotated to petition the court for a
determination of A.M.'s paternity. 83 He also contended that section 9-10-
108 required the trial court to order DNA testing upon motion of either
party. 84 In reply J.M. and B.M. argued that if section 9-10-104 did grant
R.N. standing to petition for a determination of paternity, then section 16-
43-901 required the trial judge to consider the best interest of the child be-
fore ordering a paternity test.'85 J.M and B.M. also argued that section 9-10-
104 only granted a putative father standing to seek a determination of pater-
nity for an "illegitimate child" and was obviously inapplicable to their
daughter, who, as a child of the marriage, was presumed to be legitimate.
86
R.N. countered that the phrase "[s]uit to determine paternity of illegitimate
child" was merely a descriptive heading and did not have the effect of
law. 1
87
177. Id. at 207-08, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
178. R.N., 347 Ark at 208 n.2, 61 S.W.3d at 151 n.2.
179. Id. at 208, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
180. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 151.
181. Id., 61 S.W.3dat 151.
182. Id. at 207, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
183. Id. at 208, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
184. R.N., 347 Ark. at 208-09, 61 S.W.3d at 151-52.
185. Id. at 208, 61 S.W.3d at 151.
186. Id.,61 S.W.3dat 151.
187. Id. at 210,61 S.W.3d at 153.
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c. The reasoning of the court
The court reasoned that it needed to "interpret and harmonize" sections
9-10-104, 9-10-108, and 16-43-901 of the Arkansas Code Annotated 188 to
determine whether a putative father had standing to petition the court for a
determination of paternity regarding a child born to a marital family. 8 9 The
court found that R.N. fell within the statutory definition of a "putative fa-
ther," which includes any man who is not legally presumed or adjudicated
to be the biological father of the child, but who claims or is alleged to be the
biological father of the child.' 90 It also noted that section 9-10-104 gave
putative fathers standing to bring suit to determine the paternity of an ille-
gitimate child.'9' Although agreeing with R.N. that descriptive headings in
the code are not law,' 92 the court pointed out that the General Assembly
amended section 9-10-104 in 1995 and included the heading "[s]uit to de-
termine paternity of illegitimate child" in the 1995 enactment of the statute,
"thus making the heading itself part of the statute."'193 The court also ob-
served that, absent the reference to illegitimate children in the heading, the
statute would "clearly grant" R.N. standing to seek a paternity determina-
tion for A.M. 194 Apparently, the fact that the statute did refer to illegitimate
children did not clearly deny R.N. standing because the court proceeded to
determine "whether the language in the descriptive heading that is now a
part of the statute effectively denies R.N. standing to petition for the estab-
lishment of A.M.'s paternity."'
95
The court prefaced its inquiry into the term "illegitimate child" by stat-
ing that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent
of the General Assembly' 96 and that it seeks the legislature's intent by giv-
ing the words of the statute "their ordinary and usual meaning in common
188. Id. at 207, 61 S.W.3d at 151. Section 9-10-104 of the Arkansas Code Annotated
reads: "Suit to determine paternity of illegitimate child. Petitions for paternity establishment
may be filed by: (1) A biological mother; (2) A putative father; (3) A person for whom pa-
ternity is not presumed or established by court order; or (4) The Office of Child Support
Enforcement." ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
189. R.N., 347 Ark. at 207,61 S.W.3d at 151.
190. Id. at 210, 61 S.W.3d at 152 (citing to ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-501(11),
9-27-303(42), 16-43-901(h), 20-18-701(5)).
191. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 152-53.
192. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 152-53 ("Unless otherwise provided in this Code, .. . the descrip-
tive headings or catchlines immediately preceding or within the text of the individual sec-
tions ... do not constitute part of the law and shall in no manner limit or expand the con-
struction of any section." (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-115(b))).
193. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 153.
194. See id., 61 S.W.3d at 153.
195. R.N., 347 Ark. at 210, 61 S.W.3d at 153.




language."' 97 Consequently, the court noted that it did not resort to rules of
statutory construction where the plain meaning of the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous. 198 Without any express consideration of the "ordi-
nary and usual" meaning of the phrase "illegitimate child," the court pro-
ceeded to indicate that the term was not defined anywhere in the Arkansas
statutes and then turned to the definition that it gave in Willmon: "An ille-
gitimate child is a child who is born at the time that his parents, though
alive, are not married to each other."199 Considering rulings it made under a
prior version of the paternity statute, which included the term "illegitimate
child" within its text, the court noted that it had allowed parties to litigate
paternity even where the child was presumed legitimate.20 With this point
established, the court articulated its presumption that the General Assembly
possessed full knowledge of the Arkansas Supreme Court's prior decisions,
implying that the General Assembly must have meant the term "illegitimate
child" to have the same effect that the court gave the term in its earlier deci-
sions (i.e., none at all). 20' This train of thought led the court to conclude
"that the plain language of section 9-10-104 grants R.N. standing to petition
to determine the paternity of A.M.,,
20 2
Although the court found that R.N. had standing to petition for a de-
termination of paternity, it went on to hold that section 16-43-901(e)(1),
which makes DNA testing permissive, rather than section 9-10-108, which
makes DNA testing mandatory upon a motion by either party, applied spe-
197. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 152 (citing Stephens v. Ark. Sch. for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939, 20
S.W.3d 397 (2000)).
198. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 152.
199. Id. at 210, 61 S.W.3d at 153 (citing Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 360, 761
S.W.2d 924, 925 (1988)).
200. Id. at 211, 61 S.W.3d at 153 (citing Willmon, 297 Ark. at 358, 761 S.W.2d at 924;
Thomas v. Pacheco, 293 Ark. 564, 740 S.W.2d 123 (1987)). The court failed to distinguish
either Willmon or Thomas from the one before it despite the fact that Willmon involved a
child born to a divorced mother ten months after her former spouse had commenced divorce
proceedings, and it was the husband and wife who were testifying as to the illegitimacy of
their child over the objections of the putative father in Thomas. See Willmon, 297 Ark. at
359, 761 S.W.2d at 925; Thomas, 293 Ark. at 565-67, 740 S.W.2d at 123-25.
201. R.N., 347 Ark. at 211, 61 S.W.3d at 153. In other words, the legislature presumably
knew that the court had previously allowed the legitimacy of a child born into a marriage to
be litigated and had not acted to change things when it enacted the paternity statute. Id., 61
S.W.3d at 153. The fact that the legislature amended the paternity statute after Willmon and
Thomas so as to give the words "paternity of illegitimate child" legal force was apparently an
insufficient change to indicate a legislative intent to restrict application of the paternity stat-
ute to illegitimate children. See id. at 210, 61 S.W.3d at 153.
202. Id. at 211, 61 S.W.3d at 154. Any reader who feels that the majority's train of
thought got derailed somewhere along the tracks may feel a sense of camaraderie with Jus-
tice Thornton, who confessed that he had "great difficulty in comprehending the reasoning




cifically to paternity challenges where the subject child was already pre-
203sumed legitimate. The court noted that the discretionary language of sec-
tion 16-43-901(e)(1) allowed a judge to consider the best interest of a child
"before ordering a paternity test that could forever change a child's life,
perhaps merely because the adults who caused such a tumultuous situation
are curious to know the results of their infidelity. ' '2°4 Recognizing that the
presumption of legitimacy would lose "any real meaning if a putative father
... has the ability, by merely requesting a paternity test, to forever change
the presumed legitimacy of a child born of a marriage," the court stated that
it was unwilling to "minimize" the presumption in this way.20 5 Conse-
quently, it held that once a paternity suit is initiated under section 9-10-104
regarding a subject child who is presumed to be legitimate, the trial court is
to apply section 16-43-901 as opposed to section 9-10-108, and is only to
order paternity testing if it determines after a hearing that it is in the child's
best interest to do so.
20 6
The court quickly dispatched J.M. and B.M.'s argument that R.N.
should be equitably estopped from bringing a paternity action because he
had waited until A.M. was almost nine months old before initiating the ac-
tion.207 Identifying B.M. as the proper party to raise the equitable estoppel
claim, the court found that he failed to carry his burden of proving each of
the four elements of equitable estoppel.2 °8 The court contended that there
was no proof in the record regarding the extent of B.M.'s knowledge of the
relevant facts, the point at which he learned that there was a question about
A.M.'s paternity, and that he relied on R.N.'s conduct to his detriment.20 9
Dotting its last "i," the court announced that it did not need to determine
whether R.N. had a constitutionally protected interest that granted him
standing to bring a paternity suit because it had already decided that R.N.
had statutory standing to do so.
210
203. Id. at 211-12, 61 S.W.3d at 154.
204. Id. at 213-14, 61 S.W.3d at 155.
205. Id. at 214, 61 S.W.3d at 156.
206. Id. at 215-16, 61 S.W.3d at 156-57.
207. R.N., 347 Ark. at 216-17, 61 S.W.3d at 157.
208. Id. at 217, 61 S.W.3d at 157. Namely, that:
(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the party to be estopped
must intend that his or her conduct be acted on or must so act that the party as-
serting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the latter must
be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the latter must rely on the former's conduct
to his or her injury.
Id., 61 S.W.3d at 157.
209. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 157.
210. Id. at 218-19,61 S.W.3d at 159.
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d. Concurrence and dissent
Justice Thornton opined in his concurrence that the majority of the
court essentially held "that the legislature did not mean what it said when it
enacted Act 1184 of 1995, which clearly states who has standing to bring a
paternity action in a suit to determine the paternity of an illegitimate
child. 21' Citing to Thomas v. Pacheco,212 he pointed out that the court had
previously declared a strong public policy in support of the presumption of
legitimacy.213 He also made the point that the court had previously held that
nothing in the paternity statutes purported to do away with the presumption
of legitimacy.214 After implying that the majority employed less than lucid
reasoning when it interpreted the paternity statute,21 5 Justice Thornton wrote
that he reluctantly accepted the majority's decision to confer standing on
R.N. to petition for a determination of paternity.216 He "wholeheartedly"
accepted, however, the majority's conclusion that the trial court should con-
sider the best interests of the child before ordering a paternity test.
217
In her dissent Justice Annabelle Clinton Imber agreed with the major-
ity that section 9-10-104 confers standing upon putative fathers to petition
for the establishment of paternity. 218 She disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that paternity testing is discretionary and that it comes after a hearing on
the best interest of the child when it concerns presumptively legitimate chil-
dren. 21 9 Instead she insisted that once a putative father had standing to bring
a paternity suit he also had a right to mandatory paternity testing without
any need for a "best interest" hearing. 220 She also asserted her belief that the
majority's interpretation ran afoul of the United States Constitution because
it invidiously discriminated against illegitimate children by denying them a
"best interest" hearing before mandating paternity testing for them.221 Jus-
tice Brown and Justice Glaze joined Justice Imber in this dissent.222 In a
separate dissent, Justice Brown also recommended that the General Assem-
bly "review [section] 9-10-104 at its next legislative session in light of to-
day's decision and other recent decisions of this court which relate to who
211. Id. at 219, 61 S.W.3d at 159 (Thornton, J., concurring).
212. 293 Ark. 564, 740 S.W.2d 123 (1987).
213. R.N., 347 Ark. at 219, 61 S.W.3d at 159 (Thornton, J., concurring).
214. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 159 (Thornton, J., concurring) (citing Hall v. Freeman, 327 Ark.
148, 936 S.W.2d 761 (1997)).
215. See supra note 202.
216. R.N., 347 Ark. at 220, 61 S.W.3d at 160 (Thornton, J., concurring).
217. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 160 (Thornton, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 222, 61 S.W.3d at 161 (Imber, J., dissenting).
219. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 161 (Imber, J., dissenting).
220. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 161 (Imber, J., dissenting).
221. ld. at 225, 61 S.W.3d at 163 (Imber, J., dissenting).
222. R.N., 347 Ark. at 225, 61 S.W.3d at 163.
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can raise paternity questions and with respect to what children. This is a
major policy issue that cries for clear resolution.
', 223
III. PROPOSAL
Although the reasoning of the R.N. majority may resemble a Gordian
knot, one can easily cut to its central significance: the legislature needs to
be crystal clear if it intends to limit paternity actions to illegitimate chil-
dren. If the legislature does not intend to limit paternity actions to illegiti-
mate children, then it should clarify what force and effect the marital pre-
sumption of legitimacy is to have, or whether the presumption is it be aban-
doned altogether as a barrier against claims of putative fathers. At present
the presumption inadequately protects the integrity of the marital family and
the best interest of children because the mere allegation of possible biologi-
cal paternity is sufficient to give a putative father standing to seek a deter-
mination of paternity.224 If any such individual comes forward and files a
paternity suit regarding a (presumably) legitimate child of a marital family,
then upon his motion for a paternity test the marital family and the child are
subjected to a "best interest" hearing in which a judge will decide whether
to proceed with paternity testing.225
As innocuous as a "best interest" hearing sounds, exposing a fit marital
family to the financial and emotional cost of a hearing upon the motion of a
putative father is an unwarranted and unconstitutional state invasion of fam-
ily privacy and integrity unless done in furtherance of a compelling state
interest. 226 The liberty interest that parents have in the care, custody, and
control of their children is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized" by the Court.227 "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment for-
bids the government to infringe ... fundamental liberty interests at all, no
223. Id. at 222, 61 S.W.3d at 161 (Brown, J., dissenting).
224. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (granting standing to a
putative father); Id. § 9-9-501(11) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (defining a putative father as any man
not deemed or adjudicated under the laws of the jurisdiction of the United States to be the
father of genetic origin of a child who claims or is alleged to be the father of genetic origin of
the child).
225. R.N., 347 Ark. at 211-12, 61 S.W.3d at 153-54.
226. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
227. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 774 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "the interest of parents in their
relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of
liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) (acknowledging "that the relationship between parent and child is constitu-
tionally protected"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (observing that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the Is]tate; those who nurture him and direct his des-




matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest., 28 Absent some parental unfit-
ness, there will "normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family. '229 Generally, state intrusion into private family
matters is only appropriate if it appears that the health or safety of the chil-
dren is in jeopardy, or where failure to intervene could result in "significant
social burdens. 2 30 To better protect the privacy of the family and the best
interest of marital children, the standing of putative fathers to challenge the
presumption of legitimacy should be limited. This could be done through a
statutory definition of illegitimacy that expressly excludes marital children
from the scope of suits brought under the paternity statutes, through a stat-
ute of limitations on paternity suits where the child is presumed legitimate,
by barring paternity suits upon a finding that the marital father of a child is a
fit and willing father, or through a number of methods discussed below.
A. Family Privacy and Integrity Are Entitled to Greater Constitutional
Protection Than a Merely Possible Genetic Relationship
There is a clear distinction between the degree of constitutional protec-
tion due to "an actual relationship of parental responsibility" and that due to
a "mere biological relationship. '23' Liberty demands strong constitutional
protection for the "relationship of love and duty in a recognized family
unit,''232 and the State may not intervene to terminate established parent-
child relationships in the absence of parental unfitness.233 The potential rela-
tionship of an alleged biological father is not entitled to equivalent protec-
23tion,234 and, absent a developed relationship with his child, his right to ob-
ject to the child's belonging to a legally recognized family is no greater than
that of a stranger. 235 The relationship between children and the parents who
rear them is the "basic fabric of our society" and "merits constitutional pro-
tection unless the circumstances are exceptional"; 236 whereas there is some
question as to whether the parental rights of a putative father who never
developed a "custodial, personal or financial relationship with his child"
ever "attached in the first place. 237
228. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
229. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
230. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
231. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1983).
232. Id. at 258.
233. Id. at 259.
234. Id. at 260-61.
235. Id. at 262 n.19.
236. In re Adoption of S.J.B., 294 Ark. 598, 602, 745 S.W.2d 606, 609 (1988).
237. Id. at 603, 745 S.W.2d at 609.
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The right to maintain the integrity of the family unit does not arise
from the largesse of the State, but is an intrinsic human right, deeply rooted
in our "[n]ation's history and tradition., 238 Our nation does not have a simi-
lar tradition of allowing adulterous putative fathers to claim parental rights
against the wishes, and in derogation of, an intact marital family.239 The
integrity and intimacy of the family unit is protected by the First Amend-
ment,240 "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amend-
ment.,, 24 ' Because the integrity and privacy of the family unit are fundamen-
tal liberty interests, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids government in-
fringement of those interests, "no matter what process is provided, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.',
242
B. No Compelling State Interest Presses an Inquiry into the Genetic Ori-
gins of a Legitimate Child Whose Marital Parents Are Caring and Pro-
viding for That Child
Where an illegitimate child is not receiving any paternal support, the
state's interest in identifying the child's father and requiring him to contrib-
ute to the financial support of his illegitimate child is compelling.243 Where
a child is already receiving support from a fit marital father and mother,
however, the state does not have the same compelling interest to inquire into
the genetic origins of a child.244 The "curiosity interest" of a putative father
regarding the genetic origins of a child presumed legitimate is clearly "sub-
sidiary to the interests of the state, the family, and the child in maintaining
238. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), the Court held that
the "sanctity of the family" merits constitutional protection because it is an institution
"deeply rooted in this [niation's history and tradition."
239. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-26 (1989).
240. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Inter. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
241. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (internal citations omitted).
242. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (emphasis added).
243. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (noting that the "[s]tate's interest in
providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important one"); R.N. v. J.M, 347
Ark. 203, 218, 61 S.W.3d 149, 158 (2001) (explaining that the state benefits from establish-
ing the paternity of a child without a legally recognized father because the support obliga-
tions will transfer from the state to the genetic father). Likewise, a paternity suit that identi-
fies the father of an illegitimate child will also benefit the child by ensuring that he or she
"will also be afforded all of the rights and benefits accorded children who are presumed
legitimate." R.N., 347 Ark. at 218, 61 S.W.3d at 158.
244. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53 (observing that the "[s]tate registers no gain ...
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents"); In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d
331, 338-39 (Kan. 1990) (noting that the child's best interests become a matter for state
intervention after the family unit fails to function).
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the continuity, financial support, and psychological security of an estab-
lished parent-child relationship. 245
Paternity suits were historically designed to secure paternal economic
support for illegitimate children,246 not to secure parental prerogatives for
putative fathers at the expense of presumably legitimate children. 247 The
relatively recent practice of using paternity suits to challenge the legitimacy
of marital children actually works at cross-purposes to the original aim of
paternity actions. Instead of securing some of the advantages of legitimacy
to illegitimate children, it imposes some of the disadvantages of illegitimacy
on otherwise legitimate children. A child who has been raised as the legiti-
mate child of her married parents is likely to have formulated her identity
accordingly. Where her married parents have lovingly provided her with
emotional and financial support, it seems unwise and fiscally inefficient to
jeopardize the best interest of the child by allowing a stranger to the mar-
riage to challenge the child's legitimacy.248 Where family bonds have been
created through love and the law, the state has no compelling interest to find
the child an alternate father.2 49 Furthermore, where the putative father has
not developed any relationship with his alleged child, his interest is subor-
dinate to the integrity of the unitary family and to the best interest of the
child. 250 Although the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child,25' the best interests of the child cannot be presumed to diverge from
the interests of his or her parents unless and until they are shown to be un-
fit.252 Where a child already has a developed relationship with his or her
marital parents, the mere fact that a man alleges genetic paternity should not
be allowed to threaten the stability of the child's familial and emotional
attachments.
245. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 351-52, 995
S.W.2d 338, 340 (1999) (citing Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998)).
246. See Jackson v. State, 29 Ark. 62, 68 (1874).
247. See Rodes, supra note 34, at 649.
248. See Williams, 338 Ark. at 351-52, 995 S.W.2d at 340. Shifting the duty of support
from a marital father living in the same home to a genetic father living outside the home
hardly seems to be in the best interest of the child because a child will generally have more
immediate and flexible access to the wealth of his marital father. Any economic support
gained by shifting the duty from the marital to the adjudicated father may actually come at
considerable cost to a child: the loss of a father, an identity, and a sense of stability. Further-
more, the superfluous support gained thereby may only serve to offset the legal cost to the
marital parents of defending against the action.
249. See id., 995 S.W.2d at 340.
250. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983).
251. Williams, 338 Ark. at 351-52, 995 S.W.2d at 340.
252. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982).
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C. Granting Adulterous Putative Fathers Parental Status Against the
Wishes of a Child's Fit Married Parents Interferes with Their Freedom
of Association
The "marriage relationship" is "the basic foundation of the family in
our society." 253 It is an intimate association that "promotes a way of life,"
254
and accordingly, it is an association protected by the First Amendment.255
The First Amendment provides a haven against unwarranted state interfer-
ence with those relationships, such as that between husband and wife, that
presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to . . . individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. 256
The Court has also recognized a substantive due process right "to enter
into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships., 257 "As with the
First Amendment right to associate, the [s]tate may not interfere with the
selection of individuals in such relationships. 258 More specifically, the state
may not alter the structure of a marital family by forcing the inclusion of an
unwanted individual who may impair the ability of the marital parents to
rear their children according to their views and beliefs.259 Obviously, the
right to enter into and maintain intimate relationships carries with it the
right to discontinue or avoid entering into certain intimate or private rela-
tionships.26 ° State actions that interfere with a family's associational free-
doms are only permitted where they advance compelling state interests and
where there are no alternative means of advancing those interests that are
significantly less restrictive of associational rights.
261
The Court has not defined the message or "way of life" that marriage
262 apromotes, but implicit in the laws regulating who can marry, and on what
253. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843
(1977).
254. Id. at 844.
255. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Inter. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 648. In Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, the Court indicated that
Government actions that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom [of associa-
tion] may take many forms, one of which is "intrusion into the internal structure
or affairs of an association" like a "regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire." Forcing a group to accept certain members may
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that
it intends to express.
Id. (internal citations omitted); cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
260. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648.
261. See id.
262. Arkansas law provides that "[marriage shall be only between a man and a woman.
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grounds one can obtain a divorce,263 is the message that marriage is an inti-
mate partnership between one man and one woman. Marriage, generally
speaking, not only communicates that each partner has entered into an inti-
mate association with one another, but also conveys a message that they
intend to exclude others from that same intimate association.264 The recipro-
cal commitments between the husband and wife are legally recognized, so
much so that that they are often considered contractual in nature265 and by
their exclusionary nature lay a foundation for the development of a special
and distinctively personal sharing of thoughts, beliefs, and experiences be-
tween the married couple. Marriage has also traditionally communicated
that both partners intend to rear and share custody of children born into the
266marriage.
To erase all distinctions between the legitimacy of parent-child rela-
tionships arising from marriage and those arising from extramarital sex is to
efface the traditional boundaries and significance of marriage. If a married
woman can be sexually involved with multiple men while staying married
to one, and each of these men can be adjudicated the legal father of the chil-
dren that are his genetic offspring, then has the state not effectively sanc-
tioned polyandry? Granting married women the right to establish legally
recognized child-rearing partnerships--contemporaneous with and collat-
eral to their marriage--with men other than their husbands would make
marriage take a back seat to the naked act of mating as a means of creating
legally recognized families. The holding in R.N. opens the door to such a
A marriage between persons of the same sex is void." ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (LEXIS
Repl. 2002). Section 9-12-101 provides:
No subsequent or second marriage shall be contracted by any person during the
lifetime of any former husband or wife of the person unless the marriage with
the former husband or wife has been dissolved for some one (1) of the causes set
forth in the law concerning divorces by a court of competent authority.
Id. § 9-12-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
263. One of the grounds for divorce is "[w]here either party shall have committed adul-
tery subsequent to the marriage." Id. § 9-12-301(4) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
264. WILLIAM J. O'DONNELL & DAVID A. JONES, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL
ALTERNATIVES 48 (1982).
265. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting
that marriage "is in law an essentially contractual relationship, the parties to which have
legally enforceable rights and duties, with respect both to each other and to any children born
to them"). Arkansas's statute provides that "Marriage is considered in law a civil contract to
which the consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is necessary." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
266. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (including freedom to "establish a home and bring up children" as part of
freedom to marry). That marriage traditionally communicates a desire to raise children is also
implicit in the fact that impotence is a recognized ground for divorce. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-12-301(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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possibility by granting putative fathers standing to bring an action to estab-
lish their paternity even if the subject child is presumably the legitimate
child of a marital family.267 The commitments of intimacy, exclusivity, and
familial association that marriage declares and seeks to create would mean
very little if an isolated extra-marital sexual encounter could result in the
family lines being redrawn so as to include the paramour without consent
from the non-offending spouse.268
Beyond undermining the traditional meaning of marriage, state action
compelling a parent-child relationship between an adulterous putative father
and a child that had been presumed legitimate risks impairing the ability of
the marital parents to effectively impart their values and beliefs to the mari-
tal children. A person may choose to marry a person with a similar culture
or system of belief in order to better impart those shared values to the mari-
tal children he or she anticipates having with his or her spouse. After mar-
riage, on the basis of momentary passions and more immediate considera-
tions, that person may have sex with someone with whom they would not
choose to raise children due to that person's incompatible beliefs or values.
Where such a tryst results in pregnancy, granting the adulterous paramour
legal status as father to the marital child could forcibly interject a person
into the family who holds values and beliefs that conflict significantly with
those of the marital parents. The adjudicated father would be in a position to
undermine and interfere with the ability of the marital parents to teach and
instill the fundamental values of their choice.269
If an extramarital sexual encounter accidentally results in conception,
should it eclipse the marriage as the means of defining family roles? Allow-
267. Such a generous grant of standing adds extra incentive to adultery. It provides adul-
terous men with the right to seek legally recognized parental status if they so choose, coupled
with an option to forego such status and its attendant costs by allowing both to remain with
the marital father.
268. If putative fathers, upon their motion, could require paternity tests to be taken of all
parties without a best interest hearing, as dissenting Justice Imber suggests in R.N., not only
could adulterers obtain a paternal role in the marital family without or against the consent of
the husband but also rapists could literally force their way into a family. See R.N. v. J.M.,
347 Ark. 203, 222, 61 S.W.3d 149, 161 (2001). In the intimate realm of bearing and raising
children, marriage vows of intimacy and exclusivity between husband and wife could be
written in the sand, to be washed away by the first tide of contrary passion.
269. The argument could be raised that acknowledging the paternity of a married
woman's lover, former or current, does not militate against her freedom of choice, but
merely formalizes her choice to have engaged in sexual relations with a man other than her
husband. Freedom of choice in the realm of contracts has never meant that a capable adult is
free to make choices contrary to the contract, but that one is free to enter into binding rela-
tionships that will be acknowledged and enforced by the state. Although one may later
choose to breach a contract, one may not also choose to lay the burden of the breach on the




ing it to do so favors accident and momentary passion over deliberation and
marital commitment as the chief architects of family life. Where a married
couple seeks to preserve their intimate association, despite extramarital dal-
liance, the state has no compelling interest to force them to admit another
party into the intimate ranks of parenthood in the marital family. On the
contrary, the state interest in preserving the intimate association between,
and the legitimate expectations of, marital partners runs counter to any state
interest in ensuring adulterous putative fathers a right to seek a determina-
tion of paternity against the express wishes of the marital couple.270 The
general principles of democracy and the state interest in organized freedom
are better served by supporting relationships forged by deliberate commit-
ments between men and women who agree to share the responsibilities of
child bearing and rearing, where they exist, than they are by imposing non-
consensual, adjudicated relationships.
Excluding an adulterous putative father from legal parental status in
the family is not unfair or unconstitutional where he knowingly had sex
with a married woman because, being aware of the traditional meaning and
message of marriage, he knew or should have known that he was not a le-
gitimate member of the marital family and, therefore, had no reasonable or
traditional basis to expect that he would be included as an equal partner in
the parental roles of the marital family. On the contrary, he knew or should
have known that the husband is traditionally and reasonably within his
rights to presume himself the legitimate father of any children born to his
wife. The rationale that the law should not afford different treatment to le-
gitimate and illegitimate children does not apply to legitimate and adulter-
ous fathers because, unlike children, they have control over their situation.
Also, if the adulterous putative father is married, he remains free to have
children with his own spouse and receive the same protection for his marital
parent-child relationships. If he is single, the law does not prevent him from
marrying and similarly securing his interest in becoming a father 271 or from
fathering children with an unmarried woman.
Marriage often entails express public vows, a conspicuous exchange of
symbols-such as rings, and is a matter of public record. It stands to reason
that the public expression of the intimate association is to alert the public of
the special status of the couple so that the members of the public can adjust
their behavior and expectations regarding the husband and wife accordingly.
270. See A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo. 1982) ("It appears that the legisla-
ture has carefully weighed the various social values and decided that the biological father's
rights are subordinate to the collective rights of the child, the mother, the presumed father
and the family unit.").
271. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983) (stating that "[t]he most effective
protection of the putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is
provided by the laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences").
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To the degree that marriage is a contractual agreement to associate as co-
parents in the rearing of children born into the marriage,272 marital parents
may arguably be considered as having a secured interest in parenting the
marital children. Marital status puts other potential sexual partners of the
husband and wife on notice that the respective individual has a spouse with
a prior, legally recognized interest in parenting any children born to the wife
during the course of the marriage.
D. A Mandatory Best Interest Test upon Motion of a Putative Father Is an
Inadequate Procedural Safeguard of the Liberty and Privacy Interests
of a Legitimate Child and Her Family
Because the family has a fundamental liberty interest in preserving its
privacy and integrity, even a procedure as apparently benign as a best inter-
est test is constitutionally suspect unless a compelling state interest requires
it.273 Allowing any man alleging to be a biological father to bring a paternity
suit at any time is hardly a narrowly tailored state action in any sense and,
where the child's marital parents are fit, may actually imperil the best inter-
ests of the child it is supposed to serve. Such a broad grant of standing is not
narrowly calculated to secure the best interests of children because it is "ap-
plicable to all putative fathers, 274 including those who are financially inca-
pable of supporting the child or who are incarcerated. Common sense is
insulted by the notion that it serves the best interest of presumably legiti-
mate children with fit marital fathers to allow such putative fathers the right
to compel a best interest hearing upon their motion. Stanley suggests that it
is improper for a state to disrupt an existing family on the basis of the "best
interest" of the child where the child is not imperiled by an unfit parent.
275
Because the traditional presumption is that parents are already acting "in the
best interest of their child, 276 the party seeking to disrupt the child's present
relationship with its presumed father should provide evidence of some ma-
terial detriment to the child before being allowed to subject a marital family
277to a best interest hearing.
272. See supra note 265.
273. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids government to infringe ... fundamental
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997).
274. R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 215,61 S.W.3d 149, 156 (2001).
275. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653, 657-58 (1972).
276. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
277. When dealing with an established family, the state may only interfere if the parents
are endangering the health or safety of the child or are behaving in such a fashion as to create
"significant social burdens." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
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The best interest test naturally arises during a divorce, 278 but after the
divorce proceedings, the family arrangements of the child are not disturbed
unless one of the child's parents can establish a material change of circum-
stances.279 Employing a best interest test during divorce proceedings is ap-
propriate because both parents have the same parental rights with respect to
their children. Obviously in a divorce proceeding, the issue is generally not
whether either parent is entitled to parental status, but which parent is better
suited to retain custody.28° In other words, no one's parental status is nor-
mally at stake when the best interest test is employed in the divorce context.
Although the best interest test is appropriate when deciding disputes
between parents with legally equivalent relationships to the child, it is inap-
propriately employed to assess the unproven interest of a putative father as
against the constitutionally protected, legally recognized relationships of an
extant family. 281 The state must afford a marital father and his presumed
children procedural due process that adequately corresponds to the poten-
tially grievous and irrevocable loss that they face when dissolution of a pa-
rental-child relationship is at stake.282 If the state determines that it is in the
best interest of the child to compel blood tests of all parties to the suit, then
the marital father and his presumed child face the prospect of an irrevocable
deprivation. Because the private interests of a fit marital father and his pre-
sumed child in maintaining their parent-child relationship are weighty, those
interests are due heightened procedural protections where state action
threatens to terminate them.283 In such instances, imprecise standards "that
leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge"
are constitutionally inadequate.284 To preserve fundamental fairness, a uni-
form standard is required where state action threatens to deprive parents of
their parental rights.285 A best interest hearing with unspecified factors is
obviously inadequate in this regard.286
278. Norwood v. Robinson, 315 Ark. 255, 259, 866 S.W.2d 398, 400-01 (1993).
279. Id., 866 S.W.2d at 401.
280. Id., 866 S.W.2d at 401.
281. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845
(1977).
282. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982).
283. See id. at 758-61.
284. Id. at 762.
285. Id. at 756-57.
286. See generally id. at 745 (holding that New York failed to adequately protect the
private interests of a family with a procedure that effected an irrevocable loss of parental
status without requiring clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness).
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E. Procedural Safeguards Could Better Protect the Best Interest of Chil-
dren and the Privacy and Liberty Interests of Their Families
Unless the factors to be considered in the best interest hearing are leg-
islatively or judicially described, then such a hearing is, at best, a spongy
procedural safeguard for the marital family and child, and at worst, an invi-
tation to inconsistent, ad hoc family engineering.287 To adequately protect
the privacy and liberty interests of the family, the legislature could (1) statu-
torily define the term "illegitimate child" so as to exclude presumably le-
gitimate children of a marriage from the scope of section 9-10-104 of the
Arkansas Code Annotated 288 unless the child's parents raise the issue or
consent to it being raised;289 (2) give a husband's claim to be the father of
his presumed children the same effect as an acknowledgment of paternity;
290
(3) temporally limit the standing afforded under section 9-10-104 in regards
to children presumed legitimate (i.e., a selective statute of limitations);
29'
(4) require putative fathers who seek a determination of paternity regarding
a presumably legitimate child to rebut a presumption that maintaining the
subject child's current parent-child relationship is no longer in the child's
best interests292 by clear and convincing evidence; (5) conditionally pre-
287. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (observing that "the 'best interests of the child' standard offers little guidance to judges,
and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values"); Bernadette
Weaver-Catalana, The Battle for Baby Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BuFF. L. REV.
583, 585 (1995) (noting that the "best interest of the child" standard has been criticized as
"an amorphous concept which may serve as a basis for rationalization of any result").
288. See David V.R. v. Wanda J.D., 907 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Okla. 1995) (holding that the
provisions of Oklahoma's paternity statute only apply when a child is born out of wedlock
and that the presumption of legitimacy will preclude any action under the paternity statute
unless one or both of the parents successfully rebut the presumption of legitimacy).
289. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989) (noting that the presumption
was rebuttable by blood tests according to California's statutory scheme, but only if a motion
for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child's birth, either by the hus-
band or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity, by the wife).
290. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-120 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
291. The Uniform Parentage Act provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a proceeding brought by a
presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of
a child having a presumed father must be commenced not later than two years
after the birth of the child. (b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child
relationship between a child and the child's presumed father may be maintained
at any time if the court determines that: (1) the presumed father and the mother
of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other
during the probable time of conception; and (2) the presumed father never
openly treated the child as his own.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 341 (2001).
292. See Norwood v. Robinson, 315 Ark 255, 258-59, 866 S.W.2d 398, 400-01 (1993)
(holding that putative fathers are required to bear the burden of proving a material change in
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clude further inquiry into a child's paternity as long as the child's presumed
father is found to be a fit and willing parent; (7) statutorily require consid-
eration of the extent to which a marital father and his presumed child have
already established a significant and positive personal relationship at the
outset of a best interest hearing, 293 and mandate courts to give the existence
of such a relationship conclusive effect against the claims of putative fathers
who have no developed relationship with the child; or (8) require deference
to the desires of the child (where old enough to express them) and his or her
fit custodial parents.294
The simple fact that a child has already bonded with his or her pre-
sumed father should indicate that it is not in the best interest of the child to
disestablish the legal father-child relationship that had been in place since
the child's infancy.295 The likelihood of this being traumatic for the child
and the marital father increases over time, which is why a statute of limita-
tions makes sense where an established relationship exists. Arkansas al-
ready protects adoptive parents and adopted children against untimely
claims by putative fathers,296 should the law afford marital parents and their
presumably legitimate children less protection? Procedural limits on the
standing afforded adulterous putative fathers would cut off untimely peti-
tions coming from a putative father who sat on his rights and would protect
the best interest of the child as long as the limitation on standing did not
apply to cut off the child's right to seek a determination of paternity when
objectively in his or her best interest to do so. Limiting the standing of puta-
circumstances before being allowed to seek visitation or custody arrangements that would
disrupt a child's life-long relationship with his or her mother).
293. See generally Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 399, 614 S.W.2d 667, 671 (1981)
(mandating consideration of "past relationship between the parents of the child and the rela-
tionship that may have existed between the father and the child," as well as whether "a father
has shown any concern or feeling for a child ... as well as whether the father has supported
the child in the past or to what extent he will support the child in the future," when putative
father sought paternity determination).
294. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978) (taking the desire of the subject
child into account when putative father sought to block adoption).
295. See Roque, 272 Ark. at 399, 614 S.W.2d at 671 (ordering trial court to consider the
past relationship between the parents of the child and the relationship that may have existed
between father and child, as well as the extent of past support given or support to be expected
in the future when considering the child's best interest).
296. An Arkansas statute provides:
Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one (1) year after
an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person in-
cluding the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrep-
resentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the par-
ties or of the subject matter unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor, the pe-
titioner has not taken custody of the minor or, in the case of the adoption of an
adult, the adult had no knowledge of the decree within the one-year period.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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tive fathers to challenge a child's legitimacy where the child is already an
integral member of a fit family recognizes the sanctity of the family and
promotes a stability in family relationships that benefits children.297
IV. CONCLUSION
Families are the wellspring of society and, ideally, a source of safety,
security, and instruction for children. Marriage, although not the only means
of establishing family ties, remains a valuable and traditional means of do-
ing so. Not only is it a valuable means, it has often been regarded as the
preferred means and is constitutionally protected as such. 29 9 The state can-
not constitutionally divest a marital parent or child of the parent-child rela-
tionship that exists between them unless it does so by narrowly tailored
means in the pursuit of a compelling state interest. 300 The inchoate interest
of a putative father whose only relationship to his putative child is essen-
tially that of a sperm donor does not enjoy equivalent constitutional protec-
tion.30' It is also unconstitutional for a state to invade the privacy of a mari-
tal family with a "best interest" hearing that threatens to extinguish an exist-
ing parent-child relationship whenever any man claiming to be a putative
father makes a motion for it, regardless of the amount of time that has
passed or whether he has a constitutionally protected interest in the relation-
ship.30 2 Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court has opened the door to
such hearings in R.N. v.JM.
30 3
Overemphasizing the rights of adulterous putative fathers to file pater-
nity suits comes at the expense of the rights of the marital family, which are
entitled to greater constitutional protection. 30 4 The state should take the
countervailing constitutional interests of the marital family into account
before it invades the private realm of the family. Because state intervention
in family affairs inevitably comes at a cost, wisdom dictates that it be lim-
ited to circumstances where the child's current family arrangement threatens
the child or the public.30 5 Furthermore, the Constitution forbids it unless the
state has a compelling purpose behind its intrusion into such matters and
297. McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 261 (Wash. 1987) (noting that "[c]hild devel-
opment experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in parent/child
relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent.")
298. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983).
299. Id. at 257.
300. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1993).
301. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
302. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982).
303. R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 212-14, 61 S.W.3d 149, 154-55 (2001).
304. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258.
305. See supra note 277.
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chooses the least invasive and restrictive means available to advance that
purpose.3 °6
Forcing married couples to associate with former accomplices to
spousal infidelity as co-parents of a child born into and raised as part of the
marital family imposes upon the couple's freedom of association.317 Para-
mours and putative fathers who allege nothing more than a possible biologi-
cal connection are not interchangeable equivalents to husbands and marital
fathers who have a developed relationship with their presumed child. Treat-
ing them as such strips marriage of much of its meaning and allows cavalier
exploits to eclipse marriage as the preferred means of drawing legally rec-
ognized family relationships. Mere sex is not the equivalent of marriage.
When a fundamental liberty interest--such as the fate of an existing
parent-child relationship--hangs in the balance, a hearing that employs a
subjective standard-such as the child's best interest-offers the threatened
interest insufficient procedural protection. For the aforementioned reasons,
greater protection should be afforded to the interests of presumably legiti-
mate children and the families that they are a part of from the untimely chal-
lenges of adulterous putative fathers. Marital families and the presumably
legitimate children thereof will benefit if the state takes measures to better
protect the existing emotional and legal bonds between marital parents and
their children against third party challenges. After all, children develop
emotional attachments on the basis of loving relationships, not on the basis
of blood test results.
Edward R. Armstrong
306. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000).
307. See supra Part III.C.
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